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The last decade or so has witnessed rather dramatic increases in the flow of foreign
direct investment (FDI) to the developing countries of the world. However, the balance
of evidence seems to point in one direction, the inflow has been uneven. Middle-income
developing countries have benefited from this upsurge at the expense of the
lower-income countries. In an attempt to explore the two complimentary issues involved
in FDI flows, we adopted the two-part econometric approach in which a Probit model
was first estimated in order to examine the binary issue of whether or not to locate FDI
in hitherto neglected developing countries. In the second step, a panel regression model
was employed to examine the factors that may explain the volume of FDI to further
allocate to existing FDI-receiving countries. Our findings reveal that a combination of
high per capita income, outward-orientation to international trade, a high level of
infrastructure development and a high rate of return on investment are the significant
decision parameters in the two-part aggregate investors’ behaviour analyses.
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1 Introduction
The developing countries of the world have in general been recipients of both official
and private financial flows over the last four decades. Understandably so, since in most
of these countries, the level of domestic savings is generally very low, the financial
sector is widely underdeveloped and in most cases repressed, and therefore the capacity
to harness domestic financial resources for the development of key sectors of the
economy is quite limited. A wide body of literature has investigated the role that this
flow of external financing could play in the development of recipient countries. The
convergence of opinion seems to be that on the balance, there is a net positive
relationship between external financial assistance and economic performance of
countries, particularly if and when such assistance is accompanied by conducive policy
environment (Burnside and Dollar 2000).
In the last decade or so, whereas the flow of official development assistance seems to
have declined in relative importance, the flow of private resources and, in particular,
foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries has been on the increase. A
number of reasons have been alluded to in terms of this development. One of such is the
end of the cold war and the relative increase in net official flows to the countries in
transition in Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics. Other reasons include the
growing importance of private flows, particularly in the developing countries
themselves, reflecting the new wave of liberalization and globalization and therefore the
flow of foreign investment to the telecommunications, financial services and other
sectors in many of the countries.
What seems to have characterized this increased flow of private resources, moreover, is
that it has not only been quite volatile, but has also been directed at just a few countries
or regions. Many low-income countries of Africa and the Pacific region have been left
out in terms of the benefit derivable from these increased flows since they continue to
be neglected by international investors. The question then remains as to how a
significant inflow of FDI could be attracted to these hitherto neglected developing
countries and how the volatility of inflow to existing receiving ones could be redressed.
This study, therefore, constitutes a major step towards proffering some answers to this
all-important development policy question.
What distinguish our present effort from earlier studies on this subject are two folds. In
the first instance, we have tried to recapitulate the subject matter into two
interdependent parts. The first part relates to issues as to why foreign investors may
choose to or not to allocate FDI to previously neglected developing countries, that is,
whether or not to overcome the inertia by venturing into these countries. The second
part then relates to issues of the volume of FDI to allocate to existing FDI-receiving
countries and why the volatility in flows to these countries as witnessed over the years.
Most recent studies on the subject (Collier and Pattillo 2000; Obwona 2001; Sin and
Leung 2001; Shi 2001; Chemingui 2000; Noorbakhsh and Paloni 2001; Asiedu 2002;
Addison and Heshmati 2002) have addressed only a limited area of the problem and
particularly the second part. They have sought only to explain why foreign investors
might decide to increase or decrease the volume of FDI to countries that are already
enjoying FDI inflows.
Second, with the use of pooled multi-country data, this study has tried to explain the
domestic and external, or ‘pull and push’, factors affecting aggregate investors in the2
two-part decision scenario as highlighted. This is with a view to shed more light on why
many low-income developing countries may have failed to attract FDI inflows. In this
regard, this study utilizes the two-part econometric modelling approach. This
methodology, which follows from the one that has often been used in explaining the
allocation of foreign aid by bilateral donors among developing countries (Dudley and
Montmarquette 1976; McGillivray and Oczkowski 1991; McGillivray and Oczkowski
1992; Tarp et al. 1998) is yet to be explored in the FDI literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we examine the recent
trend in FDI inflow to developing countries, highlighting the fact that the flow has been
unevenly distributed. Section 3 contains a brief review of existing FDI literature, and
the conceptual framework adopted is discussed in section 4. Empirical analyses and
results are presented in section 5 and in section 6 we examine what lies ahead for low-
income developing countries in terms of attracting foreign financial resources.
Summary and conclusions are given in section 7.
2 Recent trend in FDI inflow to developing countries
In recent times and in response to the need to provide investor-friendly environment so
as not to be left behind in the new wave of global integration, the attitude of many
developing countries has changed significantly. They have become more willing to offer
numerous financial and non-financial incentives to multinational corporations in order
to encourage them to increase direct investment flows (UNCTAD 1998). Given the
open door policies, and some external factors in the developed world such as low
interest rates and the cycle of economic growth, the flow of FDI to developing countries
has witnessed a rising trend in the last decade. As shown in Table 1, FDI flows to
developing countries increased from US$59.6 billion on average between 1989 and
1994 to US$241 billion in 2000. In the same light, the stock of FDI in developing
countries (Table 2) increased from US$257 billion in 1990 to US$2,032 billion in 2000.
Similarly, in terms of the distribution of aggregate net resource flows, Table 3 shows
that net flow of the FDI component to developing countries, which was only US$1.9
billion in 1970, and US$24.3 billion in 1990 increased to about US$178 billion in 2000.
This represents 60 per cent of total long-term resource flows or about 78 per cent of the
flow of private (non-debt) long-term resources to all developing countries in 2000.
In spite of the dramatic increases in the stock and inflow of foreign direct investment to
developing countries in the last decade as revealed by Tables 1 to 3, the geography of
the flows has been lopsided, or at best very uneven. Table 1 shows that between 1989
and 2000, two regions, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean attracted 92.5 per cent
(Latin America and the Caribbean 29.4 and Asia 63.1) of the total on average for the
period 1989 to 1994. In 2000 these two regions together continued to dominate the other
developing regions by attracting 95.2 per cent of the total FDI flows. This implies
therefore, that Africa—including the least developed countries and the Pacific region—
attracted quite an insignificant proportion of between 7.5 and 4.8 per cent of FDI
inflows to developing countries in the period 1989-94 and 2000.
Furthermore, a cursory look at Table 3 reveals quite distinctly that the middle-income
developing countries have over the years attracted a large proportion of aggregate net
resource flows going to developing countries. Table 3 shows that while the FDI3
component of net long-term resource flow to middle-income developing countries
amounted to US$175.6 billion in 1999, the flow to low-income developing countries
was only US$9.8 billion.
Table 4 further shows the top 10 recipients of FDI inflow amongst the developing
countries. These are China, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Poland, Chile, Malaysia,
Venezuela, Russian Federation and Thailand, all middle-income countries. They
received close to 70 per cent of total FDI inflows between 1992 and 1998. World Bank
(1999) classified these top 10 recipients as those that possess important advantages,
which might have made them very attractive to foreign investors. These advantages
Table 1
Foreign direct investment flows by host region, 1989-2000
1989-94
(ann. avg) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Billions of US dollars
World 200.14 331.10 385.00 478.00 692.54 1,075.05 1,270.76
Developed countries 137.06 202.22 218.87 267.56 482.60 828.31 1,004.30
Developing countries 59.64 114.58 153.31 191.17 188.93 223.51 241.04
Africa 4.01 5.93 6.44 10.97 8.27 10.47 9.07
of which least developed countries 0.89 1.66 1.65 2.17 3.21  4.77 3.89
Latin America and the Caribbean 17.51  32.31 51.28 71.15 83.20 110.28 86.17
Developing Europe 0.23 0.47 1.08 1.70 1.61 2.72 2.03
Asia 37.66 75.30 94.35 107.21 95.60  99.73 143.48
The Pacific 0.23  0.56  0.15 0.14  0. 25 0. 30 0.28
Central and Eastern Europe 3.44 14.27 12.73 19.19 21.01 23.22 25.42
Share of global inflows of FDI (%)
Developed countries 68.5  61.1 56.9  56.0  69.7 77.0 79.0
Developing countries 29.8 34.6 39.8  40.0  27.3 20.8 19.0
Africa 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.3 1.2 1.0 0.7
of which least developed countries 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 8.7 9.8 13.3  14.9 12.0 10.3  6.8
Developing Europe 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4  0.2  0.3 0.2
Asia 18.8 22.7 24.5  22.4 13.8  9.3 11.3
The Pacific 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
Central and Eastern Europe 1.7 4.3 3.3 4.0 3.0 2.2 2.0
Share of FDI inflows to developing countries (%)
Africa 6.7  5.2 4.2  5.7 4.4 4.7  3.8
of which least developed countries 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.7 2.1 1.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 29.4 28.2 33.4 37.2  44.0 49.3 35.7
Developing Europe 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.2 0.8
Asia 63.1 65.7 61.5 56.1  50.6 44.6 59.5
The Pacific 0.4  0.5 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1
Share of FDI inflows to Africa (%)
Least developed countries 22.2 28.0  25.7 19.8 38.8 45.6  42.9
Source: Anupam and Srinivasan (2002).4
Table 2
Foreign direct investment inward stock by host region, 1980-2000
1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000
Billions of US dollars
World 615.81 893.66 1,888.67 2,937.54 5,196.04 6,314.27
Developed countries 358.45 537.26 1,388.76 2,036.72 3,301.92 4,157.64
Developing countries 257.36 356.26 496.92 864.40 1,792.15 2,031.92
Africa 32.74 33.85 48.65 75.91 140.55 148.03
Latin America and the Caribbean 49.96 79.67 116.68 201.62 520.30 606.91
Developing Europe 0.16 0.28 1.13 3.26 9.45 11.46
Asia 173.35 241.27 328.23 580.70 1,118.42 1,261.77
The Pacific 1.18 1.20 2.23 2.90 3.45 3.74
Central and Eastern Europe 0 0 2.99 36.42 101.97 124.72
Share of global stock FDI (%)
Developed countries 58.2 60.1 73.5 69.3 63.5 65.8
Developing countries (a 41.8 39.9 26.3 29.4 34.5 32.2
Africa 5.3 3.8 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 8.1 8.9 6.2 6.9 10.0 9.6
Developing Europe 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Asia 28.1 27.0 17.4 19.8 21.5 20.0
The Pacific 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Central and Eastern Europe 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.2 2.0 2.0
Note: (a includes South Africa.
Source: Anupam and Srinivasan (2002).
Table 3


















1970 7.0 1.9 0.0 2.0 10.8 0.18 1.00
1980 57.0 4.4 0.0 13.1 74.5 0.06 1.00
1990 43.1 24.3 3.7 28.2 99.3 0.24 0.86
1998 82.9 155.0 14.1 23.0 275.0 0.56 0.91
1999 16.2 185.4 34.5 28.8 264.9 0.70 0.84
Low-income countries
1970 2.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 3.7 0.08 1.00
1980 13.6 0.2 0.0 7.1 21.0 0.01 1.00
1990 16.0 2.2 0.4 15.3 33.9 0.06 0.85
1998 10.9 13.4 0.6 14.5 39.4 0.34 0.96
1999 -1.2 9.8 2.6 14.7 26.0 0.37 0.79
Middle-income countries
1970 4.6 1.6 0.0 0.9 7.2 0.22 1.00
1980 43.4 4.2 0.0 6.0 53.6 0.08 1.00
1990 27.2 22.1 2.3 13.2 64.8 0.34 0.91
1998 103.6 163.4 14.9 12.8 294.7 0.55 0.91
1999 17.3 175.6 31.8 14.2 238.9 0.73 0.85
Source: World Bank (2001).5
included the market size and increased openness in the case of China, and improved
policy and strong economic fundamentals in the case of such countries as Malaysia,
Thailand and Chile. Table 4, therefore, reveals that about 93 per cent of total FDI flows
to all developing countries went to the middle-income developing countries, while their
low-income counterpart attracted just about 7 per cent of inflow between 1992 and
1998. The table also demonstrates the increasing importance of the transition economies
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics as alternative destinations of foreign
direct investment flows.
To further reinforce this argument of uneven flows of FDI to developing countries, in
Table 5, we show the ratio of FDI to GDP in the top 10 recipient countries and country
groups. As revealed by the table, in the middle-income countries, FDI/GDP ratio
increased from 0.6 per cent in the early 1990s to an average of 2.5 per cent in the late
1990s. On the other hand, the FDI/GDP ratio in low-income developing countries
increased from only 0.5 per cent in the early 1990s to about 1 per cent since 1995. For
the low-income countries that are neither oil nor mineral producing, the ratio of FDI to
GDP remained at less than 1 per cent in the last one decade.
An important point that derives from the pattern of concentration of FDI flows among
developing countries described above is the fact that the ten countries highlighted as the
most important FDI destinations constitute only about 38 per cent of the total population
of all developing countries and territories (UNCTAD 2001c). This may mean that the
remaining 62 per cent of developing countries’ population was in receipt of only 30 per
cent of FDI inflows in 1998 (Table 4). In other words, about two-thirds of the
developing world was still virtually written off the map as far as any assumed benefit
from FDI inflow was concerned during the greater part of the 1990s.
Turning to the sectoral or industrial composition of FDI inflow to developing countries,
Table 6 reveals that as a proportion of total world FDI inflows, developing countries
received only about US$26.7 billion or 22 per cent in 1988. This, however, increased
appreciably to about US$162 billion or 45 per cent of world total in 1997. In terms of
the industrial composition of these flows, Table 6 shows the rapidly growing share of
FDI flows to the services sector of developing countries. From only about US$6.6
billion in 1988, FDI inflow to the services sector increased to US$66.8 billion in 1997.
This demonstrates the growing investment in the information, communications and
technology (ICT) sectors in many developing countries in the last decade, and
particularly in the economies of the highlighted top 10 FDI recipients. Similarly, when
compared with the rest of the world, the share of inflow to the agriculture subsector in
developing countries remained consistently very high. This again is an indication of the
continuing concentration of activities in the primary producing subsectors in many
developing countries of Africa and the Pacific regions.
What seems to have emerged from this uneven and lopsided distribution of FDI inflow
is the fact that it reflects, to a large extent, the concentration of economic activities in
the world. Export performance and therefore the extent of openness to international
trade, domestic investment levels and productive activities as well as technology and
payments come to play in terms of the capacity of regions and countries to attract FDI
inflows (UNCTAD 2001b). The richer and more competitive economies of the world
tend to possess these capacities and are therefore able to receive more international
direct investment than the poorer and underdeveloped nations.6
Table 4
Net FDI inflow to developing countries: Top ten recipients and regions, 1992-98
Country/country group 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Top 10 recipients
China 11.2 27.5 33.8 35.8  40.2  44.2 42.0
Brazil 2.1 1.3 3.1  4.9  11.2  19.7 24.0
Mexico 4.4 4.4  11.0 9.5  9.2  12.5  10.0
Argentina 4.0 3.3 3.1  4.8  5.1 6.6 5.6
Poland 0.7 1.7 1.9  3.7  4.5 4.9 5.5
Chile 0.9 1.0 2.6  3.0  4.7 5.4 5.0
Malaysia 5.2 5.0 4.3  4.1  5.1 5.1 5.0
Venezuela 0.6 0.4 0.8  1.0  2.2 5.1 3.7
Russian Federation 0.0 0.0 0.6  2.0  2.5 6.2 3.0
Thailand 2.1 1.8 1.4  2.1  2.3 3.7 4.8
Share of total (%)
Low-income countries 6.9 7.2 6.2  6.9 7.4 6.5 6.8
Middle-income countries 93.1 92.8 93.8 93.1 92.6 93.5 93.2
Top 10 countries 67.6 69.2 70.7 67.2 68.8 69.5 70.1
Transition economies 9.0 9.4 8.2 16.6 13.3 14.3 13.5
Source:  World Bank (1999).
Table 5
FDI flows to developing countries, % of GDP, 1990-98
Country group 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Middle-income 0.6  0.8 1.1  1.5 1.9 2.0  2.2  2.7  2.6
Excluding China 0.6  0.8 0.9  1.0 1.3 1.5  1.7  2.3  2.2
Top 10 countries 0.7  1.0 1.4  2.0 2.5 2.5  2.7  3.3  3.1
Excluding China 0.7  1.0 1.1  1.0 1.4 1.6  2.0  2.7  2.7
China 1.0  1.2 2.7  6.4 6.2 5.1  4.9  4.9  4.2
Low-income (Non-oil exporters)
Mineral producers 0.5  1.1  1.1 1.7 1.5 2.0  2.4 2.6  2.4
Others 0.0  0.2  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6  0.7 0.9  0.9
Low- and middle-income oil
exporters
0.6  0.9  0.5 1.1  1.0 0.2  0.8  2.1 1.8
Source:  World Bank (1999).
Table 6




total Total % share
% of world
total
Primary 1.78 6.7 17.2 7.47 4.6 46.5
Agriculture 0.57 2.1 99.8 1.80 1.1 82.8
Mining, quarry and petroleum 1.22 4.6 12.4 5.67 3.5 40.8
Manufacturing 17.80 66.8 33.7 81.20 50.1 53.6
Chemicals 3.37 12.7 14.40 8.9
Machinery 1.02 3.8 4.51 2.8
Electronics 2.07 7.7 5.40 6.6
Transport and equipment 0.24 0.9 0.78 0.5
Services 6.65 25.0 14.3 66.79 41.3 38.8
Trade 0.84 3.2 5.56 3.4
Finance 0.86 3.2 7.26 4.5
Real estate 0.68 2.5 7.43 4.6
Communications 0.55 2.1 12.10 7.5
Unspecified 0.42 1.6 6.45 4.0
All industries 26.67 100.0 22.3 161.90 100.0 44.9
Source: UNCTAD (1999).7
Table 7
The inward FDI index, by regions, 1988-90 and 1998-2000
1988-90 1998-2000


























































































































World 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Developed economies 1.0 4.0 1.1 2.0 1.0 4.4 1.1 2.2
Western Europe 1.3 4.9 0.9 2.4 1.6 6.3 1.1 3.0
European Union 1.3 4.8 1.0 2.4 1.6 6.4 1.1 3.0
Other Western Europe 1.1 5.7 0.6 2.5 1.1 5.5 0.6 2.4
North America 1.1 4.7 2.0 2.6 0.9 4.4 1.6 2.3
Other developed economies 0.3 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3
Developing economies 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.7
Africa 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.4
North Africa 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3
Other Africa 1.2 0.2 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.7 0.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.2
South America 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.2 1.1 2.6 1.6
Other Latin America and the Caribbean 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7
Asia and the Pacific 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.6
Asia 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.6
Western Asia 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Central Asia – – – – 1.7 0.3 1.3 1.1
South, East and South-east Asia 1.3 0.2 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.6
South Asia 0.1 – 0.3 0.1 0.2 – 0.3 0.2
Pacific 4.5 1.6 1.9 2.7 1.2 0.3 0.5 0.7
Developing Europe 2.2 3.4 0.5 2.1 1.2 1.5 0.6 1.1
Central and Eastern Europe 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.6
Least developed countries (LDCs)
LDCs, total 0.3 – 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.1 1.0 0.6
LDCs in:Africa 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.6 0.1 1.7 1.1
Latin America & the Caribbean 0.3 – 0.4 0.3 0.1 – 0.2 0.1
Asia and Pacific 0.1 – 0.5 0.2 0.1 – 0.2 0.1
Asia 0.1 – 0.5 0.2 0.1 – 0.2 0.1
West Asian – – – – -1.3 -0.2 -0.9 -0.8
South and South-east Asian 0.1 – 0.5 0.2 0.2 – 0.5 0.2
P a c i f i c – ––– ––––
Notes: (a The ratio of the region’s share of world FDI inflows to the region’s share of world GDP;
(b  The ratio of the region’s share of world FDI inflows to the region’s share or world
employment;
(c The ratio of the region’s share of world FDI inflows to the region’s share of world exports of
foods and non-factor services.
Source: UNCTAD (2001b: 43).
To buttress the fact that these underlying factors are the major pull factors for FDI,
UNCTAD computed the inward FDI index as depicted in Table 7. This index, according
to UNCTAD (2001b), captures the ability of countries to attract FDI after taking into
account their size and competitiveness within the international economic system. The
index is an average of three ratios, showing each region’s share in world FDI relative to8
its share in GDP, employment and exports. An index value of ‘one’ indicates that a
region’s share in world FDI inflow matches its economic position in terms of the three
indicators. As Table 7 shows, while the index for the developing-country group is low
compared to the developed world, within developing countries themselves, the inward
FDI index value for South (Latin) America and central Asia exceed unity between 1998
and 2000. In the other regions of the developing world, and Africa in particular, the
index value was far less than one. For the least developed countries, the inward FDI
index values (Table 7) was below unity for the two periods 1988-90 and 1998-2000.
The inward FDI values shown in this table seem to suggest that low-income countries
are once again caught up in a now too-familiar circuitous trap, and may likely remain
perpetually unattractive to foreign investors in terms of playing host to significant and
appreciable FDI inflow. This is because the countries represented in this group of
developing economies continue to have high levels of unemployment, low levels of
capital formation, domination of primary products in exports, low level of real per
capita GDP and are grossly uncompetitive within the global trading and financial
systems.
From the foregoing, the central question then remains as to what could be done to
reverse the observed situation such that these hitherto neglected low-income developing
countries and sectors could constitute investor-friendly destinations. This is what
constitutes the primary objective of this paper.
3 Factors that determine FDI inflows: existing literature
Earlier theoretical and empirical studies on FDI have adopted either one or a
combination of two approaches. The first or the ‘pull-factor’ approach examines the
relationship between host-country specific conditions and the inflow of FDI. Under this
approach FDI is either classified as (i) import-substituting; (ii) export-increasing or
(iii) government-initiated (Moosa 2002). The second or the ‘push-factor’ approach leans
towards examining the key factors that could influence or motivate multinational
corporations (MNCs) to want to expand their operations overseas. Under this second
approach, FDI is either classified as horizontal or market seeking, vertical or
conglomerate (Caves 1971, 1974; Moosa 2002).
Turning to the first approach, Akhter (1993) posited that host-country specific
conditions might encompass a number of socioeconomic and political factors within a
country where FDI is made. These factors tend to determine available business
opportunities and pending political threats within the host countries. Among others, the
socioeconomic and political factors commonly cited in this strand of the FDI literature
include infrastructure; market size, level of human capital development, distance from
major markets, labour cost, openness of the economy to international trade, exchange
rate, fiscal and other non-tax incentives, political stability, monetary policies and the
extent of liberalization or otherwise of the financial sector. In addition to these
socioeconomic and political variables are also the presence of natural resources such as
mineral ores, petroleum and natural gas, coal, and other raw materials, the availability
of which may also act as location specific advantage in attracting FDI to host countries.
Recent studies along this line include those by Asiedu (2002); Elbadawi and Mwenga
(1997); Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001); Sadik and Bolbol (2001); Pigato (2000);9
De Mello (1997); Singh and Jun (1995); Gastanaga et al. (1998); Collier and Pattillo
(2000); Obwona (2001); Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000); Sin and Leung (2001);
Shi (2001) and Chemingui (2000).1 Addison and Heshmati (2002) recently added a new
dimension and therefore new determinants to this strand of the FDI literature. They
examined recent changes in the global economy, termed the ‘third wave of
democratization’ and the current spread of new economy in terms of new information
and communication technology as likely determinants of a developing country’s ability
to attract FDI. The two variables capturing these developments were found to have
positive effects on the inflow of FDI even though information, communication and
technology was observed to be country specific in its effect on FDI inflows.
With regards to the exposition on factors that may or may not motivate MNC’s to
expand their operations overseas, researchers have focused on firm and market-related
factors, using two interrelated hypotheses—the internationalization hypothesis and the
monopolistic advantage hypothesis as summed up in the Dunning’s eclectic theory,
(Dunning 1977, 1979, 1980; Singh and Jun 1995; Moosa 2002). Except for a few, the
majority of the previous empirical work based on the eclectic theory tend to also
consider one or two host-country specific advantages (Wheeler and Mody 1992; Cleeve
2000; Kreinin et al. 1999; Donnenfeld and Weber 2000; Okposin 1999; Globerman and
Shapiro 1999; Tuman and Emmert 1999; Barrell and Pain 1999; Urata and Kawai
2000).2
Over the years, moreover, wide divergence and convergence of views and empirical
results have characterized the FDI literature in so far as factors affecting the flow of FDI
to developing countries are concerned. An attempt to streamline the issues and albeit
provide some practical step towards resolving the diversity of views was made by
Chakrabarti (2001). He employed the technique of extreme bound analysis (EBA) and
the cumulative distribution function. The result of this recent effort provided some
evidence on the sensitivity of earlier studies with regards to the determinants of FDI
flows. It indicated a strong support for the explanatory power of market Size of the host
country, measured by per capita GDP as a major, if not the most significant,
determinant of FDI inflow. Other factors, such as openness to international trade,
wages, net exports, growth rate, tax regime, tariffs and exchange rate turned out to be
less robust though not very fragile as determinants of FDI inflow. According to these
findings, while openness to trade, growth rate and tax regime are likely to be positively
correlated, wages, net exports and exchange rate are more likely to be negatively
correlated with FDI. Finally another set of indicators such as inflation, budget deficit,
domestic investment, external debt, government consumption, political stability, human
capital, natural resources and infrastructure was found to be very fragile in their effect
on FDI inflow and are highly sensitive to small alterations in the conditioning
information set.
The objective of this paper is not to contribute towards resolving the conflict in the
literature as regards the fragility or otherwise of the respective factors so mentioned. We
have rather attempted to examine which of these host countries’ and external factors
                                                
1 For a recent comprehensive survey of literature on location specific advantage as host country
determinants of FDI inflows, see Imad Moosa (2002); Asiedu (2002); and Chakrabarti (2001).
2￿For a review of the hypotheses and studies based on such, see Imad Moosa (2002); Urata and
Kawai (2000); Billington (1999); Agarwal (1980); Ragazzi (1973).10
could well explain the policy relevant issues as to why a foreign investor in the first
instance may choose to or not to locate FDI in a previously neglected developing
country. Second, whether or not the same set of variables may be relevant in
determining the volume of FDI to allocate to existing FDI-receiving countries.
4 Conceptual framework
Most of the previous studies that try to explain FDI inflow to developing countries have
used the traditional cross-section or cross-country multiple regression and/or panel
estimation methods. These studies have been more or less directed at establishing the
empirical linkages between FDI inflow and a number of explanatory variables. This
regression model could be written as:
Yit = α 0 + α 1X + ξ  (1)
Where Yit is the FDI share of GDP for country i, (i = 1,2, .. n, N) and X a vector of
independent variables viewed as possible host-country determinants of FDI. ξ  is a
random error term with the usual properties.
As mentioned above, this paper sets out to examine two important issues. The first
relates to why foreign investors may decide whether or not to venture into those
countries that never received FDI before and the second has to do with how much to
allocate to countries already receiving significant FDI inflow. This is more or less an
aggregate foreign investors’ behaviour analysis, which necessarily involves in the first
case an eligibility decision and, second, a decision on volume of allocation. The
ordinary multiple regression model (equation 1) used in previous studies has not been
able to adequately address these issues. Suffice is to say, therefore, that an appropriate
methodology would be the two-part econometric approach which has been used to
investigate the allocation of foreign aid by bilateral donors among developing
countries.3 We have therefore adopted the two-part methodology for the analyses in this
paper.
4.1 The two-part econometric model4
Two interdependent decisions are modelled under this approach. The first is aggregate
foreign investors’ decision as to whether or not to overcome an earlier inertia and locate
investments in a hitherto neglected developing country. In this part the country selection
process may be conceptualized as one in which foreign investors identify ‘j’ different
developing countries. These countries are evaluated based on a number of relevant
socioeconomic and country characteristic indicators, ‘Zj’, depending on the motives of
the investors, which in this case we can assume to be purely, profit maximization.
                                                
3￿For an elaborate exposition of the two-part methodology, see Dudley and Montmarquette (1976);
McGillivray and Oczkwoski (1991); McGillivray and Oczkwoski (1992); Tarp et al. (1998).
4  This sub-section derives substantially from Tarp et al. (1998).11
Each of these indicators could be assigned different weights ‘α ’ such that ‘l’ number of
countries are chosen as FDI recipients among the evaluated ‘j’ countries. That is, as in
Woodward and Rolfe (1993) and Urata and Kawai (2000) we can describe the profit (π )
of multinational firm ‘i’ obtainable from undertaking FDI in country ‘j’ as:
π ij = β
′  Xj  + ξij (2)
Xj is a vector of observable characteristics of country j and ξij is a random disturbance
term reflecting measurement and/or specification error. The probability of selecting a
specific country depends on the attributes of the selected country relative to the
attributes of all other countries in the sample.
Given the profit equation (2) and on the assumption that ξij  are independently and
identically distributed with Weibull density functions (McFadden 1974), then the
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The second decision has to do with how much of FDI to allocate to the ‘l’ selected
countries. Since it is reasonable to assume that this decision should be related to the first
one above, then the amount to invest in a chosen country should be non-zero. In this
regard, a positive cut-off level, which distinguishes FDI receiving from non-FDI
receiving developing countries, was set at an FDI/GDP ratio of 0.01. This threshold
derives from Pigato (2000) who showed that on average, the FDI/GDP ratio for low-
and middle-income developing countries between 1987 and 1998 was about 1.3 per
cent. Similarly, Singh and Jun (1995) classified as a low FDI receiving country any
developing country with an average FDI/GDP ratio of 1 per cent and as a high FDI
receiving any country with and average above 1 per cent. An FDI receiving country is
then being treated as one which, over the decade 1990 to 2000, received a gross inflow
that is greater than this cut-off point.
From above if we denote as ‘j’ the potential FDI recipient countries, the econometric
model can be written as:
Ej
* = αZj + ξj ξj ~ N (0,1) (5)
Aj
* = βXj + µij Aj
* > 0, µj ~ N (0,1) (6)12
Zj  and  Xj  are regressors, α and β are parameters to be estimated. Ej
*  according to
McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991:  148) represents the difference of the indirect
utilities between the events of allocating FDI or not and Aj
*  denotes the potential
positive or significant amount of FDI, that is, an amount which is greater than the cut-
off point. Equations (5) and (6) above actually describe latent unobservable events of
the two-part decision processes. The events that can be observed and considered could
then be conceptualized as the decision of whether or not to allocate FDI to a country Ij
(a dummy endogenous indicator) and the potential or actual FDI allocated to any
receiving country over and above the cut-off point Aj. The relationships defined by the
two observable events can then be written as:
Ij = 1  if Ej
* > 0  (7)
Ij = 0  if Ej
* ≤  0 (8)
Aj = Aj
* if Ij = 1 (9)
Aj = 0 if Ij = 0  (10)
Equations (7) to (10) simply highlight the stylized facts of the two-part aggregate
foreign investors’ decision processes. That is, if given the evaluation criteria, a country
is chosen as an FDI recipient (Ij = 1), then the amount of FDI allocated to such a country
will be equal to an amount designated as the significant flow of FDI (Aj = Aj
* ). On the
other hand, if a country is not chosen, (Ij = 0), then FDI inflow to such a country will
not be observed and as such, Aj = 0. This implies that such a country or countries will
not feature in the second step of the analyses. The dependent variable in this first step is
then a binary variable with a value 1 if FDI flows to a country j is greater than the cut-
off point or threshold value and 0 if below the cut-off point. The parameters of the
explanatory variables in this step could then be estimated using the one way random
effects probit model.
In the second step, FDI as discussed above is allocated to only selected countries in the
first step, or to those countries that by our definition in this paper had received over the
last decade significant inflow of FDI. This implies that Aj is only observed when Ij ≠  0.
That is, step two is dependent on step one, such that the conventional multiple
regression or panel estimation method could be undertaken to obtain the parameter
estimates of the explanatory variables.
The equations for the two steps are as follows:
Ej* = α 0 + α 1Xj + α 2Yj + α 3 Zj + ξj  (11)
Aj* =  β0 + β1Xj + β2Yj + β3 Zj + µj  (12)
X’s are the independent variables, Y’s the country characteristic variables and Z’s are
variables representing any external indicator. α ’s and the β’s are the parameters to be
estimated. It is assumed as usual that the error components are normally distributed.13
The model as elaborated above indicates that once a decision as to whether or not to
invest in a particular country has been made in the first step, based on the selected
indicators, the decisionmaking problem changes in the subsequent or second step.
Assuming that countries k = 1,2, … l are selected in the first step as potential investment
destinations, then, l ≤  j and foreign investors will allocate FDI to receiving country ‘k’
at subsequent periods also based on selected indicators. Accordingly, if we could
hypothesize that the decisions of aggregate foreign investors are always consistent with
their objectives in the two-part interdependent decision processes, then the same set of
explanatory variables could be used in the two steps. In the empirical analysis that
follows therefore, we investigated whether the impacts of the chosen explanatory
variables are the same in the two steps.
4.2 Data and data sources
4.2.1Variables
The dependent variable used in the two steps of our analyses is the net FDI/GDP ratio
obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) online (2002a).
The explanatory variables, on the other hand, derive essentially from the pull or host-
country variables as had previously been considered in the FDI literature, and five
external or push factors. The push factors are:
ECONCYCLE: The indicator of economic cycle in the developed world (OECD
countries). This indicator (ECONCYCLE) is computed as the deviation from the
long-term growth trend of the GDP in OECD countries. We expected this variable to
have a positive sign since an upswing in the level of economic activities in advanced
countries should generate a positive flow of FDI to developing countries.
OECDGRATE: This is the annual growth rate in OECD countries, which is expected to
have the same effect on FDI inflow to developing countries as ECONCYCLE.
OECDDRATE: This is the weighted average of discount rate in OECD countries. This
variable is used to proxy the EURO DOLLAR London rate and it is expected to have
a negative effect of reducing FDI flows to developing countries.
OECDGNS and OECDEBAL: These are the gross national savings and external balance
in OECD countries, respectively. These two variables proxy the maximum volume of
resources available for foreign resource transfers by both the private and public
sectors in OECD countries. They are expected to have positive signs.
For the pull variables, we had relied on the results of the EBA analysis of Chakrabarti
(2001), Asiedu (2002), Addison and Heshmati (2002), Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001),
Singh and Jun (1995) and other previous studies for the expected signs. The explanatory
variables added to the push factors are:
−   Real per capita GDP (PINCOME) (+);
−   Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (OPEN) (+);
−   Growth rate of real GDP (GROWTH) (+);14
−   Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (TAXES) (-);
−   Import duties as percentage of imports (MDUT) (-);
−   Wages and salaries as per cent of total expenditure (WAGES) (+);
−   Commercial energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita) (COMM) (+);
−   Rate of change of consumer price index, inflation (INF) (-);
−   Domestic credit to the private sector as per cent of GDP (CREDIT) (+);
−   Fuel exports as percentage of total merchandise exports (FUEX) (+);
−   Ores and metal exports as percentage of merchandise exports (ORES) (+);
−   General government final consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP
(GCOM) (+);
−   Index of political freedom (POLT) (-);
−   Index of government crises (CRISES) (-);
−   Dummy variable to capture events of the 1990s, particularly opening up of Eastern
European countries and countries of the former Soviet republics to the
international trade and financial system which may be exerting a negative
influence on the flow of FDI to developing countries (DUMMY90) (-);
−   Real interest rate (per cent) (REINT) (+);
−   Manufacturing value added as per cent of GDP (GDPMAN) (+).
4.2.2 Data sources
Pooled, cross-country, annual time series data for the period 1970-2000 for 89
developing countries5 are used for the empirical analyses. Most of the macroeconomic
and country characteristic or institutional variables are obtained from two World Bank
sources, the World Development Indicators (online) and the Global Development
Network growth database (online). Data on political freedom, which are a composite of
                                                
5 The 89 developing countries and the countries eliminated after step one are as follows: Algeria,
Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central Africa Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Costa Rica,
Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Countries eliminated after step one: Algeria, Bangladesh, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Haiti, India, Iran, Kenya, Liberia, Nepal, Niger,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Turkey.15
two indices (political rights and civil liberty) are obtained from the Freedom House
database (online). Data on legislative fractionalization and constitutional changes which
may also proximate for political risk are obtained from the Polyarch dataset (Vanhanen
2001). FDI inflow and related data as shown in the different tables were obtained from
various World Bank (Global Development Finance) and UNCTAD (World Investment
Report) sources between 1992 and 2002 and the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (online).
One major problem with the various dataset and particularly, data from the World Bank
(2002a and 2002b) is the issue of missing data points which is so acute. In this regard,
such important variables as black market premium, rate of unemployment, exchange
rate overvaluation, rate of unemployment, secondary school enrolment rate, real
effective exchange rate, tend to reduce the number of useable observations, significance
of parameter estimates as well as the goodness of fit of the equations when combined
with other variables. This limited our use of these variables and some of the variables
listed above.
Given the problem of missing data points and the assumption that on average,
multinational corporations that undertake FDI in developing countries may face
information lag, our estimations were based on non-overlapping five-year averages of
all the variables. By so doing, we were able to reduce the problem of random
fluctuations in the data and at the same time exploit the time-series variation in the
dataset.
5 Empirical analyses and results
Equation (11) above describes step 1 of the analyses and was estimated using the probit
model. Equation (12), on the other hand represents the second step and was estimated
using the Heckman’s sample selection-corrected two-stage method. This involved
computing the Heckman’s parameter (‘λ’ or the inverse Mill’s ratio) for each
observation on the basis of the first step probit estimation and including this in the
second step regression as an explanatory variable. A second step estimation without the
Heckman’s parameter would only give unbiased estimates if the two error terms in the
two steps were independent. This means that for a country, which receives FDI,
eligibility would be independent of the amount of FDI received, a situation which may
or may not be true (Tarp et al. 1998: 18; Heckman 1979). The estimations in the second
step were based on the panel regression technique and the one way error component
random effects model.6
Different combinations of the variables were tried for the two steps of the analyses.
Only four variables, real per capita income (PINCOME), real interest rate (REINT),
(proxy for rate of return on vestment as in Addison and Heshmati 2002), the indicator of
openness (OPEN), and phones per 1,000 people (an indicator of the level of
infrastructure development adopted for our analysis) turned out to be significant and
robust in the numerous combinations considered for the two steps. These four variables
                                                
6￿For a discussion of the econometric theory behind the one way error component model as well as the
differences between the use of the fixed and random effects model, see Baltagi (1995) and Hsiao
(1986).16
then constituted the control variables for our model such that the specification shown in
column 1 of Tables 8A and 8B is the basic model for our analyses. The final results are
as shown in columns 1 to 5 of the two Tables, Table 8A for the probit estimations of
step one and Table 8B for the panel estimations in step two. The proportion of correct
predictions in Table 8A and the R
2 in Table 8B indicate that to a large extent, the two
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Number of observations 206 117 201 115 111
Number of countries 89 89 89 89 89
Log likelihood -76.168 -28.523 -38.55 -18.45 -18.676
P(n) 0.84 0.91 0.84 0.90 0.92
Notes: The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the p-values. A p-value that
exceeds 0.10 indicates that the parameter estimate is not significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels;
























































Manufacturing value added (% of GDP) (log) – 2.379
(0.09)
–––
Indicator of economic cycle in advanced
(OECD) countries (log)
– – – 24.615
(0.03)
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Gross national savings in OECD countries – – – – 5.000
(0.10)
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
(log)
– – – – 0.263
(0.57)
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(0.00)
––
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Number of observations 120 94 97 94 97
Number of countries 71 71 71 71 71
R2 0.75 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.76
Notes: The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the p-values. A p-value that
exceeds 0.10 indicates that the parameter estimate is not significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Source: UNCTAD (1999).
The results shown in column 1 of Tables 8A and 8B indicate that real per capita income,
(an indicator of market size, degree of affluence or command over commodities in a
country), and the trade/GDP ratio (an indicator of the degree of openness of an economy
to international trade), real interest rate (an indicator of the rate of return on investment),
and the level of infrastructure development, which are statistically significant in the first18
step also have a statistically significant impact in the second step of the analyses.
Similarly the signs of the parameter estimates of these variables are the same in the two
steps. These imply that there is a very high degree of consistency in terms of the criteria
which aggregate foreign investors may employ in deciding to choose whether or not to
venture into a previously neglected developing country and the decision as to the
volume of FDI to allocate to existing FDI-receiving developing countries. Table 8B also
shows that the Heckman’s parameter is significant, which may indicate that there is
some correlation between step one and step two of the analyses.
The results reported in columns 2 to 5 of the two tables show that the basic model is to a
large extent, robust to changes in specifications. Column 2 of Table 8A and 8B indicate
that when interacted with the control variables, the level of industrialization of a
developing economy turned out to be important in the decision of multinational
corporations (MNCs) to venture into such a country as well in deciding on the amount
of further FDI to locate in the receiving countries. Similarly high levels of taxes on
income, profits and capital gains may act as deterrent to MNCs that may want to venture
into previously neglected developing countries. This may also negatively impact on the
volume of FDI to further allocate to existing FDI-receiving countries (column 2,
Table 8B). The level of government final consumption expenditure, as percentage of
GDP, which may indicate the size of government in an economy, turned out to be
insignificant at conventional levels and, therefore, may not be important in the two-part
decision processes.
Column 3 of Table 8A seems to indicate that the presence of solid minerals, external
balance situation in advanced (OECD) countries and the post-1990 dummy may also
constitute, in addition to the control variables, dominant variables in the allocation
criteria of foreign investors, when deciding on whether or not to venture into a
previously neglected developing country. These variables also turned out to be
significant in the second-round decision of the volume of FDI to allocate to receiving
countries. The results reported in column 4 of Table 8A show that in addition to the
control variables, the indicator of economic cycle, the external balance situation, in
advanced (OECD) countries and the level of government final consumption expenditure
as percentage of GDP are important in choosing which developing countries to venture
into by foreign investors. On the other hand, the rate of inflation and political risk may
not be as important. For the existing FDI-receiving countries moreover, these variables
are weakly significant in the decision whether or not to locate more investments.
Finally, column 5 of Tables 8A and 8B show that besides the control variables, it is only
the presence of petroleum resources that may constitute an important factor in deciding
whether or not to venture into a previously neglected developing country. For the
existing FDI-receiving countries, the volatility of FDI inflow may, on the other hand, be
explained by the level of gross national savings in advanced (OECD) countries.
Inflationary tendencies and political risk again turned out to be insignificant.
On the basis of the results of our empirical analyses, we are able to conclude that a
combination of four variables—real per capita income, real interest rate, the indicator of
openness and the level of infrastructure development—reasonably explain why
previously neglected developing countries may have failed to attract foreign direct
investment in the last three decades. This is an indication that not only is the level of per
capita income or size of the market very important in the choice of investment location
by foreign investors, it is also necessary that countries actively engage in international19
trade. Similarly, one may posit that since foreign investors have primarily commercial
motives, they will only choose such countries where a high rate of return on their
investments could be assured and where they will not have to commit so much of their
initial investable resources to road construction, power generating equipment, water
treatment plants and telecommunication facilities.
6 Flow of FDI to neglected low-income developing countries: what lies ahead?
In the last section we identified the factors that seem to be the major determinants of
international investors’ decision whether or not to locate FDI in neglected developing
countries as well as the volatility of flows to existing FDI-receiving ones. These are the
presence of local markets as proxied by the level of real per capita GDP, the degree of
linkage of the host economy to the international trading system, the rate of return on
investments, and availability of infrastructure. All of these four factors may have
resulted in the increasing concentration of FDI in middle-income developing countries
and the industrialized countries. At the same time, they may have resulted in the
declining competitiveness of low-income developing countries in attracting significant
inflow of FDI. This is because per capita income continues to be very low (below
US$800 on average) in the low-income countries, infrastructure is poorly developed in
many of these countries and the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, which measures
the degree of openness falls significantly below appreciable level. Thus the situation of
declining competitiveness of the low-income developing countries have prevailed
despite quite favourable policy framework put in place for FDI inflow in many of these
countries in recent years. This finding corroborates the results of a number of earlier
quantitative studies, which have reached convergence on the major factors that
determine FDI inflow. This similarly corroborates the findings of UNCTAD that the
concentration of FDI seems to reflect the concentration of economic activity, and that
richer and more competitive economies tend to receive more international direct
investment than the poorer and less competitive ones (UNCTAD 2001b).
All of these would suggest that low-income countries and the least developed countries
of the world may continue to be marginalized well into the coming decades in terms of
the distribution of FDI inflow. This is because many of the economic reform
programmes instituted in these countries are yet to transform into positive results in
terms of increasing rates of growth, increasing level of economic activity, increasing
participation in international trade, and high per capita income levels. Similarly, most of
the low-income countries continue to rely more on locational advantages to attract FDI
inflow which, on the other hand, are based on cheap labour and natural resource
endowments, factors that have turned out to be weakly significant in many earlier
studies. This means that the concentration of FDI inflow in high and middle-income
countries may even intensify.
The question then arises as to whether the ability of the low-income countries to attract
a substantial magnitude of FDI inflow from the conventional western sources can
improve in the nearest future. One may be tempted to posit that the prospect does not
look too bright. It is most unlikely that these countries could attain such a level of per
capita income and integration into the global trading and financial systems that could
make them internationally competitive in the next couple of years. This may suggest
that even though the recent upsurge and expansion of FDI inflow into developing20
countries as a whole is a welcome development in itself, it may not be able to
compensate for the declining levels of official development financial assistance, which
will need to be directed to the poorer or low-income developing countries. In this
regard, a critical re-examination of current donors’ practices, their major instruments
and channels of aid delivery for private sector development in low-income countries
may be required. This is because if for the observable factors, an improved flow of FDI
to the hitherto neglected developing countries may not be realized in the nearest future,
then the flow of official development assistance for private sector development from
donors may serve as a veritable option.
Having said this, it is still important for the low-income developing countries to focus
more on policy factors. These will include factors that could integrate them into the
global trading system, fiscal and non-fiscal incentives, the improvement of
infrastructure, human resources development, the creation and nurturing of local
entrepreneurship. All of these will have to be consistent with the entrenchment of
suitable political and legal framework and such other conditions for productive
investment and private sector participation in order to set the stage for the process of
growth and development.
In realization of these, many low-income developing countries have in recent times
opened up their economies to foreign investment by eliminating or reducing various
types of regulatory barriers. Many of these countries have designed policies to shift
away from targeting specific sectors or specific foreign investors, and have sought to
promote broad-based private sector participation in economic development. All of these
efforts will need to be intensified and widespread in the low-income developing
countries. Similarly the low-income countries will all need to strive to significantly
reduce, if not completely abolish, the system of government equity participation in joint
ventures. Government participation in joint ventures in many of these countries has
continued to perpetuate the existence of underperforming and inefficient state-owned or
state-managed enterprises which in most cases account for a disproportionately high
share of the GDP (Ramamurti 1999). The move towards privatization of these
enterprises or free market orientation as being recently undertaken in a sizeable number
of countries may result in renewed interest by foreign investors in the form of equity,
joint venture or even sub-contracting.
Regional economic cooperation among low-income developing countries may also help.
Since the size of host-country market has turned out to be an important determinant of
FDI inflow, developing countries, and especially the smaller ones could improve their
chances of attracting FDI inflow through participation in regional economic integration.
These schemes have the potentials to enlarge the size of accessible markets and attract
the attention of market-seeking FDI. Similarly, regional economic cooperation among
low-income developing countries could pave the way for exploiting the potentials of
intra-regional investments that may be substantial and prove useful for the restructuring
of industries in participating countries for improved efficiency. Recent experiences in
this regard could be found in the way in which many South African corporations have
expanded into the member countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
and are now expanding further afield into the other countries of the much wider
Common Market for Eastern and Southern African Countries (COMESA).
Significant changes in the productive structures in many low-income developing
countries may also have an impact in attracting FDI. An important facet of this21
structural shift could be in the form of greater foreign trade in manufactured inputs as
opposed to the primary products and raw materials as is currently the case. Increased
foreign trade in manufactured inputs may result in more FDI by the final users of these
inputs and increased trade liberalization in both the host and home countries. Many
countries, such as Mauritius, have been successful in their attempt in this regard by
utilizing their low wage workers in export processing zones in order to expand their
exports of intermediate goods. Though others have not been too successful (Nigeria,
Botswana), the fact remains that the more outward oriented an economy becomes, the
more successful such economies tend to be in their attempt to encourage FDI inflow.
Lucas’s (1993) investigation of Southeast Asian countries provides some evidence of
the relative importance of the outward-oriented policies. Specifically that FDI is
relatively more elastic with respect to demand for exports than to aggregate domestic
demand. This implies too that for low-income developing countries to be successful as
export-oriented economies and be able to attract FDI, they have to put in place liberal
trade policies, remove to a significant extent all forms of quantitative and barriers of
equivalent effect to the free flow of goods, services, payments and labour. Not only
could this attract export-increasing FDI, it could also attract import-substituting FDI.
As was noted in this study, and as in many earlier studies, a high rate of return on
investment could be an important determinant of FDI inflow to previously neglected
low-income countries. The measure of rate of return adopted for this study is the real
rate of interest, as previously used by Addison and Heshmati (2002). This implies that
positive real rate of interest may signal positive return to domestic savings, an indicator
which may be important to aggregate foreign investors. Moreover, a positive real rate of
interest can only be ensured in an economy with a complement of monetary and fiscal
policies that will guarantee monetary stability and low levels of inflation. This also
implies that to a reasonable degree, the financial system will have to be liberalized, free
of government controls and, therefore, free of repression. Liberalized financial markets
in low-income developing countries will not only reduce the degree of fragmentation of
the sector, it could also lead to a well-developed and diversified financial markets and
instruments, all of which breed investor-friendly environment.
By way of summary, one may want to say that while a number of host-country factors
may act as determinant of the decision by foreign investors to locate direct investment
in previously neglected low-income countries, some are much more critical to the
decision than others. Factors such as natural resource endowment and probably cheap
labour may arouse investors’ interest. More importantly, however, are macroeconomic
fundamentals, openness of the economy to international trade and the availability of
reasonably developed infrastructure. Similarly, the channelling of official development
assistance towards private sector development in low-income countries may well
complement the insufficient flow of FDI to these countries.
7 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the last decade or so has witnessed dramatic increases
in the inflow of foreign direct investment to developing countries of the world as a
whole, and at the same time recorded a declining volume of flow of official
development assistance. FDI inflow however has been uneven, but lopsided in terms of
the geography of distribution across the developing countries. High and middle-income22
developing countries, countries of Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean,
have continued to receive larger share of the flows at the expense of lower-income
developing and least developed countries of the world. The sectoral distribution of the
flow has followed exactly the same pattern, such that in the low-income developing
countries, FDI inflow is concentrated in the primary sectors, particularly in agriculture
and mining.
Multi-country panel data for 89 developing countries over the period 1970 to 2000 were
employed to explore two complementary policy issues that relate to aggregate foreign
investors’ decisions in terms of FDI location in developing countries. These two issues
are the factors that may influence aggregate investors’ decision first in choosing to or
not to allocate FDI to hitherto neglected countries and second, in determining the
volume of FDI to allocate to existing FDI-receiving countries. These issues are key in
terms of shedding some light as to why many low-income developing countries have
never attracted FDI and reasons for the volatility of FDI inflow to the few receiving
countries. The methodology adopted for this study departs radically from what received
FDI literature seems to suggest. We adopted the two-part econometric approach. This
approach entailed the use of a probit model to examine the binary issue of whether or
not to locate FDI in a developing country as a first step. A chosen country in this step is
assumed to be a significant recipient of FDI inflow based on a threshold of FDI/GDP
ratio of 0.01. Countries that have received more than this average inflow over the
decade 1990 to 2000 were termed existing FDI-receiving country. In the second step of
our analyses, a panel regression model was then used to examine the factors that may
explain the volume of FDI to further allocate and the volatility of flows to the existing
FDI-receiving countries. In the two steps, moreover, our assumption is that aggregate
investor’s decisions are always consistent and interdependent in the two steps, such that
the same set of explanatory variables were used for the probit and the panel regression
models.
The results of the first step analysis indicate that a combination of high per capita GDP,
high rate of return on investment, outward-orientation to international trade and the
level of infrastructure development are the significant and important decision
parameters in choosing whether or not to locate investment in a developing country. The
panel regressions of the second step seem to point to the fact that the volume of FDI to
allocate to existing FDI-receiving developing countries and the volatility of such inflow
may be explained to a large extent by the same factors. Though in this second step,
some other determinants of FDI inflow as previously reported by earlier researchers
turned out to be marginally significant. These variables include political risk, taxes on
income, profits and capital gains, the level of inflation, the level of financial sector
development and the availability or otherwise of solid minerals and petroleum
resources. We also had integrated a number of push factors into our analyses. These
include the indicator of economic cycle, the gross national savings, and the external
balance situation in advanced (OECD) countries. However only the indicator of
economic cycle turned out to be significant in the two steps.
What seems to have emerged from the analyses in this paper is the fact that low-income
developing countries may continue to be marginalized far into the distant future in terms
of the inflow of FDI. This is because these countries are still characterized by low levels
of per capita income, fragmented and underdeveloped financial system, low level of
integration into the international trading and financial systems, poorly infrastructural
base, and slow pace of response of economic fundamentals to reforms that could arouse23
to appreciable degree the level of investors confidence. One may be led to conclude,
albeit with caution, given the nature of the data employed that a combination of
mutually re-enforcing factors such as sound monetary, fiscal, trade and exchange rate
policies, fewer records of political instability and macroeconomics crises, reforms
tailored specifically at factors that hitherto hindered FDI inflow may all enable the
previously neglected and the receiving countries to attract FDI inflow. Similarly,
renewed donor efforts in terms of channelling substantial amount of official
development assistance for private sector development may be an important component
in the sustainability of external development financing for developing countries.
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